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Chikungunya
Disease Outbreak,
Reunion Island
To the Editor: A serious outbreak
of chikungunya disease recently
occurred on Reunion Island (popula-
tion ≈770,000) (1). Between March 1,
2005, and April 30, 2006, ≈255,000
cases were reported in this French ter-
ritory in the Indian Ocean. Most cases
occurred after mid-December 2005,
with a maximum of 45,000 cases dur-
ing the week of January 29 to
February 4, 2006 (2). Surveillance
figures were confirmed by a serosur-
vey that found a prevalence of 18% of
recent infection markers in pregnant
women in March 2006.
Chikungunya is a self-limiting
febrile viral disease characterized by
arthralgia or arthritis. Symptoms may
last for several months, but recovery
was, until now, considered universal
(3). However, in January 2006, the
health authorities on this island start-
ed receiving death certificates men-
tioning chikungunya as a cause of
death, either direct or indirect. By the
end of April, 213 death certificates
with this finding had been received.
To assess the affect of chikungunya
disease, we compared the crude death
rate (CDR) observed during the out-
break period with an expected death
rate computed from the 2002–2004
historical data.
The study included the period
January 1, 2005, through April 30,
2006. The expected number of deaths
(all causes) for 2005 and 2006 was the
number of deaths by sex and age
observed during 2002–2004 modified
by an estimation of the population size
for 2005–2006. The details of this
method, which was used during the
heat wave in France in 2003, have been
reported (4). The number of deaths in
Reunion was obtained daily from 13 of
24 computerized registry offices
throughout the island and represented
87% of the deaths on the island.
During 2005, the monthly CDR
remained within expected range of
statistical variation. From January
through April 2006, respectively,
monthly CDRs were 7.1%, 34.4%,
25.2%, and 8.3% higher than expect-
ed rates (p<0.01 for February and
March). This corresponded to 226
excess deaths reported by the 13
offices participating in the study and
260 excess deaths when data were
extrapolated to the entire population
of the island (an increase of 18.4%)
(Figure). The 260 excess deaths is a
crude figure that includes potentially
all causes of death. This figure leads
to a rough estimate of the case-fatali-
ty rate for chikungunya disease of
≈1/1,000 cases. Excess deaths were
observed mainly in persons >75 years
of age.
CDRs began to exceed the expect-
ed range during the last week of
January 2006 and remained elevated
until the end of the study period. This
situation closely matched the kinetics
of the epidemic curve of chikungunya
disease. CDR is a stable variable in
time for a defined population. Only a
massive phenomenon can have an
effect on it, and no other abnormal
health event affected the island at this
time. Thus, the outbreak of chikun-
gunya disease was likely responsible
for most of the excess deaths observed
in Reunion during the first 4 months
of 2006. 
Deaths associated with chikungun-
ya disease have been rarely reported.
This outbreak in Reunion is the first
with such a high incidence in a setting
where real-time death reporting is a
standard procedure. In such settings,
CDR monitoring should be consid-
ered syndromic surveillance and
should be implemented when an
abnormal health phenomenon affects
large populations.
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Assay to Detect
H5N1 Oseltamivir
Resistance 
To the Editor: Oseltamivir is a
neuraminidase inhibitor approved for
treatment and prevention of influenza
virus infection. Oseltamivir resistance
caused by a single amino acid substi-
tution from histidine (H) to tyrosine
(Y) at position 274 of the neu-
raminidase active site has been report-
ed in persons infected both experi-
mentally and naturally with influenza
Avirus subtype H5N1 (1,2). Evidence
suggests that using lower doses of
oseltamivir or shorter-than-recom-
mended treatment periods can con-
tribute to emergence of viral resist-
ance (1,3) Currently, oseltamivir is
being used in several countries that
may be affected by epidemics of
H5N1. Therefore, monitoring for
oseltamivir-resistant strains of H5N1
during oseltamivir administration is
essential for outbreak management
and prevention.
Although real-time PCR or
pyrosequencing is more rapid than
high-throughput assays for mutation
detection (4,5), the conventional PCR
technique can be applied to detect
drug-resistant mutation (6) in areas
lacking real-time PCR or pyrose-
quencing capabilities. Therefore, to
discriminate between oseltamivir-
sensitive and oseltamivir-resistant
strains, we developed a simple
method, based on PCR, which takes
advantage of the H274Y substitution.
The forward primer was designed
from the conserved region common to
both wild-type and mutant strains; the
reverse primers were designed specif-
ically for wild-type and mutant
strains, respectively, derived from the
3′ terminal base of each primer. The
primers consisted of a forward primer
N1f (nt 517-534: 5′-GGGGCTGTG-
GCTGTATTG-3′) and reverse primer
H274r (nt 759-784: 5′-GGATAA-
CAGGAGCAYTCCTCATAGTG -3′)
for wild-type strain detection or
Y274r (nt 759-784: 5′-GGATAACA-
GGAGCAYTCCTCATAGTA-3′) for
mutant strain detection. (Note: Under-
lined letters represent differences in
nucleotides between plus vs. minus
primers.) Both strains yielded prod-
ucts of ≈267 bp; hence, the assay con-
sisted of 2 separate reactions for
detecting wild-type and mutant
strains, respectively.
For each reaction, 1.0 µL cDNA
was combined with a reaction mixture
that contained 10 µL 2.5× MasterMix
(Eppendorf, Hamburg, Germany), for-
ward and reverse primers at a final
concentration of 0.15 µM, and nucle-
ase-free water to a final volume of 20
µL. Thermocycling conditions com-
prised initial denaturation at 94°C for
3 min and 35 cycles of amplification
including denaturation (94°C, 30 s),
annealing (65°C, 50 s), extension
(72°C, 45 s), and final extension
(72°C, 7 min). Subsequently, 10 µL
of the amplified products was ana-
lyzed by using 2% agarose gel
electrophoresis.
To optimize the assay, we per-
formed PCR-based H274Ymutagene-
sis of the N1 fragment of the H5N1
virus (primers on request). The result-
ing mutagenic and wild-type products
were cloned into the pGEM-T Easy
Vectors (Promega, Madison, WI,
USA), confirmed by direct sequenc-
ing, and then used as positive con-
trols. Preliminary results showed that
the wild-type primer was specific for
the oseltamivir-sensitive strain,
whereas the mutant primer can be
used to detect the oseltamivir-resistant
strain exclusively because no signifi-
cant cross-amplification had been
observed.
To establish sensitivity, serial 10-
fold dilutions of the standard N1 plas-
mids (wild-type and mutant) ranging
from 109 to 101 copies/µL were used
as a template. The threshold concen-
trations for detection of wild-types
and mutants were 103 copies/µL. To
provide semiquantitative data to
detect subpopulations of the resistant
variants, the 2 control plasmids were
mixed at wild-type:variant ratios of
108:102, 107:103, 106:104, 105:105, 104:
106, 103:107, and 102:108. The result
showed that the density of the expect-
ed bands depended on the amount of
DNA templates (Figure B). However,
the mixing experiments indicated that
the predominant mixtures of wild-
type:resistant variant were 80:20,
which is the lowest ratio of resistant
variants that the assay can reliably
detect (data not shown). To assess
specificity, human DNA and viral
cDNA extracted from other subtypes
of influenza A virus (N2–N9) were
subjected to this assay. No cross-reac-
tion occurred with human DNA or
other subtypes of influenza A virus.
We further validated the assay by
testing 3 specimens from hosts treat-
ed with oseltamivir and 17 specimens
from untreated hosts; infection with
H5N1 was detected by using multi-
plex real-time PCR (7). The speci-
mens from oseltamivir recipients
were isolated from a Vietnamese
patient on the third day after he
received a prophylactic dose (1) and
from 2 tigers (CU-T7 and KU-11) (8).
The specimens from untreated hosts
were isolated from the plasma of an
H5N1-infected human (9) and from
virus-containing allantoic fluid iso-
lated from infected chickens, ducks,
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